One hundred fifty-five participants completed a survey on Amazon's Mechanical Turk that assessed characteristics of phishing attacks and requested participants to describe their previous experiences and the related consequences. Results indicated almost all participants had been targets of a phishing with 22% reporting these attempts were successful. Participants reported actively engaging in efforts to protect themselves online by noticing the "padlock icon" and seeking additional information to verify the legitimacy of e-retailers. Moreover, participants indicated that phishers most frequently pose as members of organizations and that phishing typically occurs via email yet they are aware that other media might also make them susceptible to phishing scams. The reported consequences of phishing attacks go beyond financial loss, with many participants describing social ramifications such as embarrassment and reduced trust. Implications for research in risk communication and design roles by human factors/ergonomics (HF/E) professionals are discussed.
INTRODUCTION
I applied for a part time job through Craigslist and had to do a credit check to successfully apply. I thought it was OK since lots of employers now do credit checks. I entered my social and lots of other information… By next week I had several pings in my credit report of suspicious activity. Someone had taken out a credit card in my name and also tried to get a loan. I was scared, honestly, that someone could use my information in that way. I was also angry… The experience reported above describes a real-world instance of phishing behavior as described by an actual victim. Contrary to popular beliefs, phishing is not always obvious or easy to detect. If it were, criminals would be less likely to pursue this avenue of fraud. In general, phishing attacks use social engineering tactics to scam users into unknowingly releasing personal information to some unidentified party. Personal costs associated with attacks include loss of time, stress, decreased trust and use of the internet (Dhamija & Tygar, 2005; Hardee, West, & Mayhorn, 2006) and embarrassment.
However, personal costs are not the only consequence of phishing attacks as financial costs are commonly incurred as well. On average, an individual phishing attack costs approximately $866 and contributes to over 3 billion dollars lost annually (Gartner, 2007) . Due to the potential monetary rewards, it should be of little surprise that over 20,000 unique phishing attacks are launched monthly (Anti-phishing Working Group, 2011 ). While we know about the specific impacts of phishing attacks, little is known about how users conceptualize phishing.
Much of the previous work to address the risks of phishing has focused on the technology-side of the humantechnology interaction equation. Some authors suggest that regardless of how good security technology is, the "people problem" must be overcome for successful security (Schneier, 2000; West, Mayhorn, Hardee, & Mendel, 2009) . Previous research has shown security mechanisms for encryption, authorization, and authentication are difficult for users to understand or use (Furnell, 2005; Furnell, Jusoh, Katsabas, 2006) . Interestingly, few articles focus entirely on the human side of the user-security interaction (Schultz, Proctor, Lien, & Salvendy, 2001) .
A study conducted by Downs, Holbrook, & Cranor (2006) examined the decision strategies used when attempting to identify phishing emails. Results showed email users generally employ unreliable strategies that focus on text, rather than more reliable measures such as email headers. In other work, Downs, Holbrook, & Cranor, (2007) attempted to identify predictors of phishing susceptibility. Results showed participants with a better understanding of the internet and how it works (e.g., how to read URLs) were less susceptible to phishing. Finally, Sheng, Holbrook, Kumaraguru, Cranor, and Downs (2010) investigated the relationship between demographics and phishing susceptibility. Results indicated females and those between the ages of 18 and 25 were most susceptible to phishing.
While the research outlined above identifies various behavioral characteristics associated with phishing susceptibility, little consideration has been given to the cognitive and perceptual processes that may affect phishing susceptibility. A better understanding of how these processes affect phishing susceptibility will allow more specific predictions regarding when and where phishing attacks are likely to be successful. Thus, in addition to identifying the behavioral characteristics associated with phishing susceptibility, there is a critical need to identify the impact of cognitive and perceptual processes.
Overview of the Study
The current study was conducted to support an ongoing effort to build a user friendly decision support tool to help users distinguish legitimate communications from phishing attempts. The algorithms that will make such a tool effective will be based on the knowledge gleaned from our understanding of cognitive and perceptual factors that put people at risk during phishing attacks.
Before examining the potential role of cognitive and perceptual processes in phishing susceptibility, it is important to understand how phishing is currently conceptualized. A better understanding of this knowledge may identify any misconceptions users have concerning phishing attacks. While the results of the current study will support an ongoing effort to build a tool that aids users in identifying phishing, results have the potential to aid in the creation of better methods and guidelines to educate users to avoid phishing attacks.
The goal of the present study was to provide preliminary (pilot) data to inform the design of future experimental studies of phishing. Specifically, perceptions of phishing and related characteristics (e.g., consequences) were examined. Respondents were also asked to describe personal phishing experiences including the media in which the attack occurred and the consequences.
METHOD Participants
At present, one-hundred fifty-five participants have been recruited from Amazon's Mechanical Turk (mTurk) and compensated .50 cents for participation. mTurk (www.mturk.com) is an online pool of individuals that complete general information tasks for compensation. Overall, the mTurk pool varies more than the traditional sample obtained from an American university psychology class (Buhrmester, Kwang, Gosling, 2006) . The study used a stratified sampling technique to increase the range of responses with country of residence serving as the stratum. Specifically, fifty percent of the recruitment was restricted to the United States, while the other fifty percent was open to individuals in any location. In the current paper, all participants are treated as one group and their country of residence is not discussed.
Examination of the demographic data suggests a diverse sample in terms of age, gender, and race (Table 1 ). In addition, twenty-two percent of participants reported being victims of phishing attacks with the remainder indicating they had experienced phishing attempts. Sixty-three percent indicated that these attempts occurred less than one year ago.
Participants were generally knowledgeable and vigilant about computer security (Table 2) . A majority of respondents (84%) indicated "they had noticed the padlock in the lower right hand corner of their browser." The least likely security measure observed was the stopping of a transaction because a site was missing a seal of approval (e.g., VeriSign), and yet approximately half of the respondents indicated they had taken such measures in the past. Have you ever stopped a transaction or avoid a transaction because you did not see a seal of approval such as Verisign listed at checkout?
.51 .50
Note: Choices for all items were: 0 = no, 1 = yes. n = 155
Data will be collected from approximately forty-five additional participants bringing the total sample size to 200 when the study has been completed. We anticipate presenting final results at the HFES Conference in October 2012.
Materials
Computer Usage and Risk Profile Tool. Participants provided demographics and completed a computer usage and risk profile questionnaire (Nyeste & Mayhorn, 2009 ). The profiler included items to assess basic computer usage (e.g., number of emails sent per week), computer security and personal security (Table 2) .
Phishing Survey
A survey was developed using the Qualtrics online survey tool to collect information about perceptions of phishing and disseminated via mTurk. Participants answered general questions about their perceptions of phishing, factors related to phishing, and personal phishing experiences. A copy of the survey is available from the first author upon request.
Perceptions of phishing.
Participants answered an openended question that asked them to provide a definition for phishing. Responses to this question reflect individual perceptions based on previous experiences with phishing that include the likely media of interaction (e.g., email, instant message, etc.), ongoing thoughts and feelings during previous experiences, and when the participants discovered that they were the target of phishing.
Factors related to phishing. Perceived factors related to phishing were also measured. Items were included that assessed participants' perceptions of the consequences of being phished. Participants also answered questions about the characteristics of phishing attacks (e.g., phishing occurs using the following media). Responses to these items required participants to select a rating ("strongly disagree," "partly disagree", "neutral," "partly agree," "strongly agree"). Space was also provided for additional information.
Personal phishing experiences. Information about personal phishing experiences was also collected. Participants answered questions about a phishing experience with negative consequences (e.g., "what types of communications took place between you and the phishers?").
Procedure
Respondents followed a link from mTurk to the survey. After providing informed consent and demographics, participants completed twenty-eight questions on various aspects of phishing. Immediately following the survey, the computer usage and risk profile tool was completed.
RESULTS

Data Analysis
Qualitative and quantitative responses to survey items were captured via Qualtrics and imported into SPSS for analysis. All quantitative responses were coded on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree; 2 = partly disagree; 3 = neutral; 4 = partly agree, 5 = strongly agree). Scores were computed by averaging the response to each question.
Qualitative responses to open-ended questions were used to enhance the quantitative results.
Perceptions of Phishing
When asked to define phishing in their own terms, participants provided a wealth of data in terms of the media of communication and their perception of the phisher's intent. As illustrated by the comment below, a large number of respondents gave a traditional definition of phishing such as, When a person impersonates a website or other trusted entity with the intent of data harvesting. Usually this is used for identity theft or access to someone's personal accounts.
Others, however, provided broader interpretations of phishing. For instance, An illicit attempt to acquire personal information from a computer user.
Contact with someone on the internet to gain personal information.
An attempt to get a person to supply identity info: name, address, social security #, PayPal account password, banking password....
Factors Related to Phishing
Characteristics of phishing. Characteristics of phishing were assessed by asking participants whether a given attribute was associated with phishing (Table 3) . Respondents generally agreed phishers may pose as a number of different entities. Specifically, the highest rated characteristic of phishing was posing as a member of an organization one belongs to while pretending to be a friend or family member was rated the lowest.
Qualitative comments suggested that phishing communications often sound "too good to be true" and include "exciting or unbelievable offers." In addition, comments also revealed phishing attacks often use a "strong pitch," and attempt to elicit "a feeling of urgency to get stuff done now", by using "a limited time offer or high pressure tactics" in an attempt to get victims to act quickly.
Phishing media. To assess the media in which phishing attacks occur, participants were asked if different forms of media were common in phishing attacks. Respondents generally perceived all mediums were related to phishing. Specifically, participants rated e-mail the highest and face-toface communication the lowest.
Qualitative comments generally focused on three additional methods used in phishing attacks with approximately 53% of 68 qualitative responses fitting into one of three categories: text messaging (20), TV and/or newspaper (8), and job boards (8) such as Craigslist.
Phishing consequences. The consequences of phishing were assessed by asking participants whether a given statement was the result of a phishing attack. As shown in Table 3 , respondents largely perceived all statements as potential consequences of phishing attacks, indicating the effects are not limited to financial costs or loss of material items only (e.g., money, property, etc.), but may have social ramifications as well (e.g., loss of trust, embarrassment). 
Survey responses for the factors related to phishing
Note: All choices were: 1 = strongly disagree; 2 = partly disagree; 3 = neutral; 4 = partly agree, 5 = strongly agree.
n = 155
Qualitative comments underscored potential psychological impacts resulting from phishing attacks. Specifically, of the 70 responses to "other consequences of phishing," 34% referenced negative emotional feelings such as "embarrassment, shame or loss of self-confidence." Another four percent of responses cited "missing real opportunities" such as offers from businesses or potential jobs. As one participant wrote, Craigslist has lots of jobs but I am afraid to respond to their ads because a scammer can pretend to be an employer. The scammer's ads look just like real ones.
Personal Phishing Experience
Participants were asked a series of open-ended questions about their personal phishing experiences. Preliminary analysis of the responses given (N = 123) indicate a majority of phishing attacks were conducted via e-mail (84%) while the least common method was a link received via instant message (6%).
Although most respondents reported experiencing traditional phishing attacks such as "lottery scams," or emails claiming to be from trusted organizations (e.g., IRS, bank, etc.), some reported other methods. For instance, one respondent reported a phishing attempt after they contacted a breeder attempting to buy a puppy. What's more, the phishing attack described at the beginning of the current document was reported by a participant in the current study.
Some participants reported identifying phishing attacks immediately by simply reading the email and noting spelling or grammatical mistakes. Others indicated the use of more sophisticated methods such as looking at email headers.
Participants were also asked to report what they were thinking or feeling during the phishing attack. In general, comments focused on feelings of emotional distress or anger, supporting findings previously reported from the current study.
DISCUSSION
While the topic of phishing and social engineering is not a new one, the current focus on the human side of the HCI equation promises to expand our knowledge in this area. The preliminary results presented in the current study illustrate a number of findings. One, almost everyone recruited for this study had experienced a phishing attempt with 22% reporting that these attempts were successful. Two, participants reported actively engaging in efforts to protect themselves online by noticing the "padlock icon" and seeking additional information to verify the legitimacy of e-retailers. Three, participants identified that phishers often pose as members of organizations rather than family members or friends and that phishing typically occurs via email yet they are aware that other media might also make them susceptible to phishing scams. Finally, the consequences of phishing attacks go beyond financial loss with many participants reporting social ramifications such as embarrassment and erosion of trust.
These data also suggest that perceptions of phishing may be expanding. Traditionally, a widely accepted model for phishing includes a suspicious email being sent from a phisher for the express purpose of monetary gain (Anti-phishing Working Group, 2011) . From participants' reported comments, this definition of phishing needs to be broadened to include instances where the victim unknowingly approaches the phisher (as described in the job-board comments above), the communication media deviates from email messages, and fraudulent intention supersedes monetary gain to include malicious efforts to embarrass or reduce trust in online interactions.
Theoretical Contributions
The role of cognitive and perceptual processes has received little attention in prior phishing research. Results of the current study will aid the design of future experimental studies of phishing. Specifically, further research should explore the relationship between cognitive and perceptual processes and the strategies used to identify phishing attacks.
Applied Contributions
With the current impetus in phishing research on the human, HF/E professionals can use the results presented here to contribute their expertise. First, HF/E knowledge about cognitive design principles can be applied to website navigation to assist people in protecting themselves from phishing. Armed with an understanding of how people acquire accurate knowledge regarding risks and benefits (Wogalter, Mills, Paine, & Smith-Jackson, 1999) , HF/E professionals can actively assist computer scientists in the development of effective, usable interventions that protect the public. For instance, the qualitative comments provided for phishing characteristics suggest that phishing attacks often attempt to lure victims by eliciting a sense of urgency. Because participants reported using various cues such as grammar and spelling mistakes to identify phishing attacks, this finding has significant implications. For instance, previous research indicates individuals are less likely to pay attention to such cues when presented with urgency information and as a result are more likely to be phished (Vishwanath, Herath, Chen, Wang, & Rao, 2011) .
This instance illustrates where and how an HF/E intervention could be useful in the form of a web-based warning that identifies improperly used credibility cues (Wogalter & Mayhorn, 2008) resulting in inappropriately heightened online trust. Developing online warning communications that provide cautionary messages regarding risks and ensuring that such messages are attention getting, understandable and persuasive are critical to preventing phishing attacks (Hardee, West, & Mayhorn, 2006; Wogalter, 2006) . After all, every internet user deserves protection from manipulation and economic abuse.
